REGULATING COUNSEL RESIGNATION IN INTERNATIONALARBITRATION: ETHICAL EXITS AND INSTITUTIONAL OVERSIGHT

In a time when global politics is increasingly shaped by unstable power dynamics, prolonged conflicts, and shifting alliances, international legal systems are under growing strain. One striking development, often overlooked, is the steady increase in law firms and individual practitioners stepping back from representing states in international adjudicatory settings, particularly in arbitration. What used to be a quiet, professional decision between lawyer and client is now drawing public attention and bringing with it suggestions that some form of external regulation may be necessary. This shift points to a deeper structural issue. International arbitration has always operated in a space that is legally and ethically ambiguous. Unlike national court systems, which are underpinned by clear rules and enforceable ethical codes, arbitration is intentionally detached from any single legal system. Proceedings often take place in jurisdictions where the lawyers involved are not even licensed to practice. That raises hard questions: whose ethical standards apply, and who, if anyone, has the authority to enforce them? 

Trade across borders has, for decades, played a central role in shaping global economic trajectories. Its influence has extended beyond macroeconomic growth to impact private enterprise and individual mobility. But the very forces that have made international trade more expansive, i.e., economic liberalization, capital mobility, and transnational investment, have also produced a sharp rise in legal disputes that cross jurisdictions. These disputes, whether initiated by private entities, multinational firms, or sovereign governments, tend to resist resolution within domestic legal confines. Arbitration, in its various forms – commercial, investor-state, and interstate, has come to occupy this space as the dominant mode of settlement. Its procedural adaptability and formal neutrality have, in many cases, made it preferable to court-based litigation. Yet embedded within this system are unresolved concerns, particularly around the ethical constraints (or lack thereof) on counsel. Unlike national courtrooms, arbitration lacks a universally enforceable code of professional responsibility, leaving counsel to navigate a fragmented and often inconsistent set of obligations.  

The problem is made worse by the lack of a centralised international authority that can hold counsel accountable. National bar associations have neither the mandate nor the reach to regulate lawyers acting in international arbitral forums, and they rarely even try. What this leaves us with is a regulatory vacuum, in which no coherent, universally accepted ethical framework exists to guide or restrain lawyers operating across borders in arbitration.

The absence of a universally accepted code of conduct creates uncertainty, often leading to conflicts that can compromise the fairness and integrity of arbitration proceedings. Despite ongoing academic discussions and numerous international legal conferences addressing this issue, little tangible progress has been made in establishing a comprehensive regulatory framework. This gap in ethical governance leaves room for potential misconduct, creating an environment in which counsel may be faced with difficult choices about their professional obligations.

Fundamentally, the goal of arbitration is to ensure a fair and efficient resolution of disputes. For arbitration to maintain its legitimacy, it must meet both the expectations of its direct participants: such as businesses, investors, and state entities and those of the broader international legal community. Credibility in arbitration is built upon key principles such as mutual respect, good faith, professionalism, and integrity. These values guide interactions between counsel and arbitral tribunals and are essential in maintaining the procedural integrity of arbitration.

Moreover, these duties extend beyond the tribunal to include opposing counsel and parties, who have the right to expect a fair and transparent arbitration process. If counsel fail to uphold these ethical responsibilities, they not only jeopardise the fairness of proceedings but may also weaken their own client’s position before the tribunal. This raises another important question: how can a lawyer effectively balance their duty to advocate for their client while maintaining ethical obligations towards the tribunal and opposing parties? Striking this balance is crucial to preserving the credibility of arbitration.

Historically, legal systems have upheld the right of both lawyers and clients to sever professional ties when necessary. However, voluntary withdrawals in arbitration remain a largely unregulated and underexplored issue. This raises critical concerns about a fundamental aspect of the rule of law: the right of every individual or entity to legal representation and a fair defence. The decision of counsel to resign from a case disrupts both the proceedings and the discourse on access to justice and the rights of the parties involved.

Given these complexities, counsel resignation in arbitration is no longer merely a matter of professional discretion but an evolving legal and ethical challenge. There is an urgent need for clearer rules that balance counsel’s moral convictions, procedural fairness, and the client’s right to representation. 

Recognising the current dilemma, this article examines the existing legal framework governing counsel resignations, the gaps within this framework, and the extent to which arbitral tribunals can intervene in such decisions. It also explores alternative mechanisms that could help address this issue more effectively, ensuring that arbitration continues to function as a fair, efficient, and credible dispute resolution mechanism.

II.        Collision of ethics and advocacy: The high-profile resignations 

The issue of counsel resignation gained significant visibility in March 2022, when two highly regarded international lawyers, Alain Pellet and Paul S. Reichler, publicly withdrew from their roles as legal counsel to Russia and Nicaragua, respectively. Pellet, in an open letter, explained his resignation by stating that “Russia had become an absolutely indefensible client.” Reichler likewise cited his “moral conscience” as the decisive factor behind his decision to resign. These high-profile departures prompted a renewed debate over whether legal practitioners, who are ordinarily bound by professional obligations to their clients, may ethically withdraw from representation on the basis of personal, moral or political convictions.^[1]

It is indeed true when the renowned scholar Martti Koskenniemi remarked that, “[i]nternational law is what international lawyers do and how they think.” In the absence of a universally accepted ethical code for legal practitioners operating in the international sphere, standards of professional responsibility are often left open to interpretation. As Pellet rightly noted, while law itself functions within a framework that accepts a degree of uncertainty and subjectivity, the role of counsel is not that of a neutral arbiter. Lawyers are, by definition, expected to construct and present the most persuasive argument in support of their client’s position, even when that position may be politically fraught or morally contentious.^[2] The resignations following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, however, challenge this notion, suggesting that political ideology and ethical considerations are increasingly influencing legal representation.

The implications of this trend are far-reaching. Arbitral tribunals are now witnessing a surge of objections concerning such resignations, raising yet another fundamental question: does a lawyer have an absolute right to withdraw from representation under the pretext of professional discretion? Traditionally, decisions regarding the continuation or termination of legal representation were considered matters to be resolved privately between counsel and client. Recent high-profile resignations, however, point to a shifting landscape in which professional judgment alone may no longer suffice, and external oversight or normative guidance has become necessary. The decision by Albert Jan van den Berg, along with several other barristers from Essex Court Chambers, to withdraw from representing Russia in its ongoing matters, including the long-running Yukos arbitration, reflects this evolving dynamic. These actions signal an increasing willingness among practitioners to allow moral and political considerations to shape the boundaries of professional engagement.^[3]

Despite the codification of professional conduct rules across various jurisdictions, international dispute resolution, particularly in arbitration, lacks a well-defined legal framework governing counsel resignation. While instances of counsel withdrawal have been adjudicated in the past, tribunals have rarely addressed resignations based on reasons extraneous to the legal dispute itself. The conflict between Russia and Ukraine has brought renewed attention to this gap, highlighting the need for a wider international conversation. Fundamentally, the issue revolves around the principle that legal representation ought to remain accessible regardless of political or moral concerns. This evolving situation raises pressing ethical and legal questions concerning how professional duties, individual conscience, and the client’s right to an effective defence intersect and sometimes collide.

The complex ethical dilemma faced by counsel is powerfully captured in Reichler’s statement: “Lawyers can defend more or less questionable causes. But it has become impossible to represent, in forums dedicated to the application of the law, a country that so cynically despises it.” This remark reflects the growing debate over whether legal professionals, despite their binding ethical obligations, may justifiably withdraw from representation when confronted with personal moral objections. 

III.       Comparative analysis: International and national approaches

The regulation of legal counsel’s conduct and withdrawal in international arbitration exhibits considerable variation across jurisdictions. A comparative analysis of major arbitration centres such as Singapore and the United States, alongside India, a country known for its arbitration-friendly stance and growing influence in the field, reveals distinct approaches shaped by differing legal traditions and institutional priorities. Similarly, leading arbitral institutions adopt varied frameworks, ranging from stringent regulatory oversight to more flexible arrangements, reflecting their unique procedural cultures. This analysis shows that institutional rules, national laws and professional ethics do not always align. For greater clarity and predictability, institutions should, as far as possible, frame their rules in line with the laws of the seat while still addressing the practical needs of international arbitration.

A. Singapore

Singapore has established itself as a leading centre for international arbitration, known for its procedural efficiency and emphasis on party autonomy. The Singapore International Arbitration Act,1994 [“IAA”] and the Singapore International Arbitration Centre [“SIAC”] Rules provide limited direct guidance on counsel resignation.^[4] However, ethical

obligations for legal practitioners are outlined in the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules, 2015 [“PCR”], particularly concerning conflicts of interest and responsibilities towards the arbitral tribunal.^[5]

A key aspect of Singapore’s regulatory framework is Rule 34 of the PCR, which restricts legal practitioners from holding executive positions in certain businesses unless covered by specific exemptions.^[6] This rule is designed to uphold the independence and ethical integrity of the profession, ensuring that legal practitioners do not engage in external activities that could compromise their professional responsibilities.^[7] Notably, lawyers are prohibited from involvement in businesses such as real estate agencies and debt collection firms, where legal expertise might be used for undue commercial advantage as envisaged within the Ong Teck Ghee Case.^[8] However, they may engage in law-adjacent sectors like intellectual property consultancy and tax advisory, provided these remain linked to their legal practice.

The application of these ethical rules is not rigid and depends on contextual factors. Past disciplinary cases like Law Society of Singapore v. Tan Chun Chuen Malcolm indicate that while some external roles may be acceptable, others, particularly those with direct financial stakes in legal proceedings, pose significant ethical concerns.^[9] Despite these structured regulations, the PCR does not comprehensively address situations where lawyers may wish to withdraw from a case due to personal moral dilemmas. This gap

underscores the evolving nature of professional ethics and the need for continuous refinement of regulatory frameworks.

B. United States

In the United States, an attorney’s decision to withdraw from client representation is governed by ethical considerations, procedural requirements, and judicial discretion. Unlike clients, who have an absolute right to terminate legal counsel at any time, lawyers must justify their withdrawal under established legal and ethical frameworks.^[10]

The American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct [“ABA Model Rules”] provide the primary guidelines. Rule 1.16(a) of the ABA Model Rules mandates withdrawal if continuing representation would violate the law or ethical rules, or if the attorney’s physical or mental condition impairs their ability to represent the client effectively.^[11] 

Voluntary withdrawal under Rule 1.16(b) is permitted in specific instances, such as when a client insists on criminal or fraudulent conduct, fails to meet financial obligations, or makes continued representation unreasonably difficult. A breakdown in the attorney-client relationship, such as an irreconcilable disagreement over litigation strategy, may justify an attorney’s withdrawal from a case. Estate of Falco v. Decker is a leading illustration of this principle. In that case, the California Court of Appeal held that an attorney could withdraw where the relationship had deteriorated to such an extent that meaningful communication had become impossible and the client’s conduct undermined the attorney’s ability to provide effective representation. The court emphasised that the conflict did not need to rise

to the level of overt misconduct; the decisive factor was whether the deterioration had created an atmosphere in which competent advocacy could no longer be ensured. The decision thus clarifies that Rule 1.16(b) permits withdrawal not merely in the face of express client obstruction, but also when the practical realities of the relationship prevent counsel from carrying out their professional duties.^[12]

However, withdrawal is subject to court approval, particularly when a case is at a critical stage. Courts assess whether withdrawal would prejudice the client, as seen in Aceves v. Superior Court, where an attorney’s motion was denied because it would have left the client unrepresented on the eve of trial.^[13]

This underscores that before withdrawing, lawyers must take reasonable steps to protect their client’s interests, including providing sufficient notice and assisting in the transition of representation. Failure to do so may result in disciplinary action.^[14] 

C. India

India’s approach to counsel resignation in international arbitration blends statutory provisions, professional ethics, and judicial oversight. The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, [“Arbitration Act”] which is based on the UNCITRAL Model, does not explicitly address counsel resignation.^[15] However, several provisions of the Act indirectly shape how tribunals should respond to counsel withdrawal. Section 19 affirms that

arbitral proceedings are not bound by the Code of Civil Procedure or the Indian Evidence Act, thereby giving tribunals broad discretion to regulate procedure, including issues arising from counsel resignation.^[16] Section 18 requires that parties be treated equally and given a full opportunity to present their case, which obligates tribunals to manage counsel withdrawal in a manner that does not compromise due process or create undue prejudice.^[17] Further, Section 24 empowers the tribunal to determine the manner of conducting hearings, allowing it to set timelines or impose conditions to minimise disruption caused by a change of counsel.^[18] Read together, these provisions support the assertion that the Act implicitly tasks tribunals with ensuring that any resignation by counsel is handled fairly and without unnecessary delay.

Ethical obligations for lawyers in India are primarily governed by the Advocates Act, 1961 [“Advocates Act”], and the Bar Council of India Rules. The Bar Council of India Rules outline the duties an advocate owes to the Court, which include not doing anything that may unduly influence the tribunal, acting respectfully, and not refusing to appear in a case for which a special fee has been paid. While these rules don’t specifically detail resignation scenarios, they provide a framework for ethical conduct that could justify withdrawal under certain circumstances, such as conflicts of interest or a client’s insistence on unethical behaviour.  

Section 1, Chapter II, Part VI of the Bar Council of India Rules mandates that an advocate must make every effort to prevent their client from engaging in unfair or improper conduct concerning the court, opposing counsel, or other parties, conduct that the advocate themselves is bound to avoid. If a client persists in such behaviour, the advocate is obligated to refuse representation. Furthermore, an advocate must not act merely as a mouthpiece for their client but should exercise independent judgement,

ensuring that language in correspondence is measured, avoiding offensive attacks in pleadings, and maintaining restraint in courtroom arguments.^[19]  

The absence of specific provisions in the Arbitration Act regarding counsel resignation means that tribunals often rely on general principles of procedural fairness and the ethical guidelines of the Bar Council of India to address such situations. This can lead to uncertainty and potential inconsistencies, particularly in international arbitrations involving parties and counsel from different jurisdictions.  

D. Stance of various Arbitral Institutions

Arbitral institutions adopt varying approaches to counsel ethics, reflecting differences in regulatory philosophies. While some institutions impose explicit ethical obligations, others rely on national professional codes or international guidelines.   

The LCIA stands out for incorporating ethical provisions directly into its rules. The 2014 LCIA Rules introduced an Annex titled “General Guidelines for the Authorised Representatives of the Parties”, which outlines ethical duties, such as prohibitions on false statements, reliance on fabricated evidence, and improper unilateral contact with arbitrators.^[20] Tribunals can sanction misconduct with reprimands, cautions, or other necessary measures under Article 18.6 of the LCIA Rules. Despite some criticism regarding its non-

mandatory language, the Annex was retained in the 2020 revision, reflecting its broad acceptance.^[21]  

In contrast, the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre [“HKIAC”] opted against specific ethical regulations. During the 2018 rule revision, the HKIAC Rules Revision Committee concluded that barristers and solicitors were already bound by professional conduct codes issued by the Hong Kong Bar Association and the Law Society of Hong Kong, rendering additional institutional rules unnecessary.^[22]   

SIAC also does not include ethical provisions in its rules. In 2018, the

Singapore Institute of Arbitrators issued non-binding Party-Representative Ethics Guidelines, emphasizing honesty and professionalism. However, these guidelines remain separate from SIAC Rules and do not override existing professional conduct standards.   

Similarly, the Australian Centre for International Commercial Arbitration [“ACICA”] mentions the IBA Guidelines in Article 9.2 of its 2021 Rules,^[23] requiring parties to use their “best endeavours” to ensure compliance. While non-mandatory, this provision signals recognition of the need for ethical standards.   

In general, institutional methods for regulating behaviour in arbitration are disjointed and frequently do not correspond with national laws. This misalignment leads to practical difficulties, complicating the enforcement of these regulations. The LCIA has taken a proactive stance in tackling these matters, whereas numerous other arbitral institutions either rely on national laws or depend on optional guidelines. Consequently, attaining consistency

in ethical principles for legal advisors continues to be a considerable obstacle. This persistent inconsistency highlights the larger discussion regarding whether arbitration ought to adhere to formal regulations or persist within a more adaptable system that recognises diverse legal customs.

IV.                    The great resignation: Why the existing ethical rules fall short in governing counsel withdrawals

While counsel hold the right to resign, traditionally this right was expected to be exercised before formally accepting the client. Even so, there exists no clear literature demarcating the process and consequence of a resignation based on the personal ethical considerations of the counsel, extraneous to the subject matter at hand. However, the evolving dynamics of this practice reflect a shift from placing the client’s interests on the highest pedestal to balancing them with the counsel’s rights, ensuring that this equilibrium does not severely compromise the client’s interests.

In most domestic legal systems, lawyers and law firms operate under established professional conduct rules. In India, the Bar Council of India Rules, framed under the Advocates Act, regulate legal professionals.^[24] In the United Kingdom, solicitors and barristers follow the Solicitors Regulation Authority [“SRA”] Standards and Regulations and the Bar Standards Board Handbook, respectively.^[25] Similar principles apply in international proceedings, though their scope and enforceability are more limited compared to domestic legal frameworks.

While international ethical guidelines were introduced to create a standardised framework distinct from domestic regulations, their practical reach remained constrained. For example, the International Criminal Court’s [“ICC”] Code governed only those advocates appearing before the ICC, while the United Nations’ professional conduct rules functioned as non-binding soft law. Recognising the need for broader applicability, the Study Group of the International Law Association on the Practice and

Procedure of International Tribunals proposed ‘The Hague Principles on Ethical Standards for Counsel Appearing before International Courts and Tribunals’ in August 2010.^[26] Though not legally enforceable, these principles aimed to unify existing ethical obligations across various international judicial and arbitral bodies.

Beyond these overarching ethical standards, international arbitration has been shaped by specialized guidelines designed to reinforce fairness and procedural integrity. This is a result of the hybrid approach to adopt uniform ethical codes that are co-opted as part of the institutional rules. To this end, the IBA introduced the “IBA General Principles for the Legal Profession” on 20 September 2006. While these principles addressed conflicts of interest, they failed to clarify the process for counsel resignation or withdrawal from representation.^[27]

To remedy this omission, the IBA later formulated the “International Principles on Conduct for the Legal Profession”, initially adopted on 28 May 2011 and subsequently revised on 11 October 2018 [“IBA Principles 2018”].^[28]

These principles delineate the professional obligations of counsel in international arbitration, encompassing their duties to clients, opposing parties, and the legal system. On the issue of resignation, Principles 3 and 7 establish limited grounds under which withdrawal is permitted. Principle 3 states that when a conflict of interest arises after representation has commenced, a lawyer may step down entirely or withdraw from representing a specific client while continuing to represent others.^[29] Principle 7 further permits resignation for justifiable reasons, provided adequate notice is given. In situations where withdrawal could adversely affect the client’s interests, tribunal approval may be necessary, and counsel must take reasonable steps to minimize any negative consequences.^[30]

Additionally, Principle 9 underscores the requirement of professional competence, implying that a lawyer who cannot meet the necessary standards should either voluntarily withdraw or be removed at the client’s request. Even after resignation, counsel must uphold their duty to safeguard the client’s interests.³¹ This includes ensuring a smooth transition by providing sufficient notice, facilitating the appointment of a replacement, returning case-related documents, and refunding any unearned fees. These restrictions serve as safeguards against arbitrary withdrawals that could disrupt proceedings. A comprehensive reading of these ethical codes highlights the fundamental expectation that legal representatives must act with integrity, diligence, and efficiency while complying with professional standards.

Alongside the IBA Principles 2018, the “Guidelines on Party Representation in

International Arbitration”, adopted by the IBA in 2013,^[31] sought to establish

a more uniform approach to counsel conduct in arbitral proceedings. Here, the intentional use of “guidelines” instead of “rules” is indicative of its contractual nature, thereby making it voluntary and persuasive in nature. This non-binding nature of the IBA Guidelines, however, has led to considerable criticism, as their enforceability remains uncertain even when parties agree to be bound by them. Since they are merely “guidelines” rather than strict legal rules, counsel can argue that non-compliance does not warrant sanctions.^[32] Moreover, if a lawyer believes that the ethical framework of their own jurisdiction, for being less restrictive, provides a strategic edge, they may simply recommend that their client reject the adoption of these guidelines. Moreover, none of the measures suggested can resolve the alleged conflicts of interest, unless the tribunals find that the alleged conflict can potentially endanger the “integrity of the arbitral proceedings.”^[33] As a result, despite their intention to harmonize ethical standards across jurisdictions, their practical impact remains limited.

However, the IBA guidelines are recognised as a supplementary framework in international arbitration without overriding the ethical provisions of National Bar Associations, becoming applicable only through party agreement or tribunal discretion. These guidelines address various ethical concerns, apart from resignation, including party representation (Guidelines 4-6), communication with arbitrators (Guidelines 7-8), submissions (Guidelines 9-11), disclosure (Guidelines 12-17), witnesses and experts (Guidelines 18-25), and remedies for misconduct (Guidelines 2627). While all guidelines impose ethical obligations on counsels, enforcement is primarily outlined in Guidelines 26-27, granting arbitral tribunals the authority to address violations.^[34] In the modern legal

landscape, Bar Associations increasingly collaborate for mutual benefit, as seen in the East Africa Law Society, uniting Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika, Zanzibar, Rwanda, Burundi, and South Sudan, and the Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe [“CCBE”]), which sets ethical standards across European nations.^[35] The CCBE’s Code of Conduct establishes common ethical rules for cross-border legal practice, significantly influencing arbitration ethics for European lawyers.  

In furtherance of this context of Europe, reinforcing the IBA regulations are the LCIA Rules, revising Rule 18 (now, rule 18.4) of its Arbitration Rules in 2014 to regulate legal representation. Under this rule, any modification to a party’s legal team requires tribunal approval, with the tribunal retaining discretion to deny changes that could compromise the arbitral tribunal’s composition or the finality of an award. Collectively, these international and institutional frameworks form the foundation for assessing the scope, limitations, and procedural requirements governing counsel resignation in arbitration. 

Other attempts, though not entirely ground-breaking, have also sought to address ethical considerations for counsel within institutional arbitration frameworks. The HKIAC Rules Revision Committee, during its 2018 rule revision discussions, considered introducing ethical standards for legal representatives but ultimately decided against it. The rationale behind this decision was that barristers in Hong Kong are already bound by the Code of Conduct issued by the Hong Kong Bar Association, while solicitors must adhere to The Hong Kong Solicitors’ Guide to Professional Conduct prescribed by the Law Society of Hong Kong. As a result, the Committee

did not find it necessary to incorporate explicit ethical provisions within the HKIAC Rules, in contrast to the approach taken by the LCIA.^[36]

Similarly, in April 2018, the Singapore Institute of Arbitrators’ Working Group released the Guidelines on Party-Representative Ethics [“SIARB Guidelines”]. These guidelines emphasise that party representatives must maintain honesty, integrity, and professionalism when advising and representing their clients, ensuring ethical conduct both towards their clients and the tribunal. However, the SIAC has not formally adopted these guidelines, meaning they do not apply to arbitrations governed by SIAC Rules. Additionally, the SIARB Guidelines explicitly state that they do not override existing ethical standards or professional codes applicable to party representatives. Consequently, their practical impact remains rather limited.^[37]

On the other hand, the ACICA has taken a more explicit approach by incorporating a reference to the IBA Guidelines within its 2021 ACICA Rules. Article 9.2 of these rules requires parties to make their “best endeavours” to ensure that their legal representatives comply with the IBA Guidelines.^[38] Notably, this provision was already present in the 2016 ACICA Rules, and its non-mandatory wording, merely urging parties to seek compliance rather than imposing a binding obligation, surely limits its enforceability.^[39] Nevertheless, the explicit acknowledgment of the IBA Guidelines in ACICA Rules is a step forward in promoting uniform ethical standards in international arbitration.

However, it is important to recognise that even with the establishment of comprehensive rules, discussions on counsel resignation based on ethical

grounds remain largely confined to specific concerns. One such issue is ‘Double Deontology,’ where a lawyer is subject to conflicting ethical obligations across multiple jurisdictions, making compliance with one set of standards potentially a violation of another. Another critical concern is ‘Inequality of Arms,’ which arises when differing ethical standards allow one party’s counsel to engage in conduct that the opposing counsel is prohibited from, leading to procedural imbalances and an uneven playing field in arbitration. Moreover, the concepts of ‘Integrity and Fairness’ are essential for preserving confidence in the arbitration process. Unethical conduct, like presenting false statements or evidence, can greatly undermine the integrity of processes and may also affect the enforceability of arbitration awards.^[40]

           V.      The Conditional Right to Resign: Balancing Professional

Duties and Ethical Considerations

The right of legal counsel to withdraw from representing a client is well established under both domestic and international guidelines. In certain cases, withdrawal is obligatory, whereas in others, it remains a matter of discretion. This distinction underscores that the right to resign is not absolute but rather subject to specific conditions. A common scenario where withdrawal is warranted is when a client seeks legal assistance in engaging in unlawful activities. While attorneys have a duty to represent their clients, they may justifiably withdraw in such cases, as continuing representation would conflict with both their personal ethical standards and broader professional values.^[41] However, the expansion of this right to resign for unrelated reasons falls outside the intended scope of withdrawal.

This issue has recently surfaced in the context of Russia, where legal professionals and firms have attempted to withdraw from representing the nation in cases unrelated to its actions in Ukraine.^[42] While Russia’s conduct may be widely condemned from an international law perspective, withdrawing from ongoing legal matters that are unconnected to humanitarian violations establishes a problematic precedent. Such actions amount not only to the abandonment of a client but also to the disruption of legal proceedings, affecting the overall remedial framework. The resignations of legal counsel representing Russia have led to a ripple effect, prompting similar withdrawals in cases involving Belarus. This trend underscores the principle that while attorneys possess the right to withdraw, it must be exercised only in justifiable circumstances. Upholding professional obligations requires lawyers to continue representation under normal conditions, reserving resignation for exceptional cases.

For both mandatory and discretionary withdrawals, legal systems discourage unwarranted resignations. The ABA Rules, for example, explicitly differentiate between situations where withdrawal is compulsory versus those where it is discretionary.^[43] In cases of mandatory resignation, attorneys have no option but to step down if the conditions necessitating withdrawal are met. In contrast, discretionary withdrawals introduce complexities, requiring an assessment of whether resignation is justified. Many jurisdictions, including international legal bodies such as the IBA, require a determination of “good cause” or a “justifiable reason” for withdrawal, often accompanied by sufficient notice to the client.

This can also be justified on the basis of the International Code of Ethics for Lawyers, by the International Council for Commercial Arbitration’s

congress that mention rules that mirror both the CCBE Rules and IBA International Code of Ethics Rules.^[44] Rule 2, mirroring IBA International Code of Ethics Rule 3; CCBE General Principle 2.1, mandates that lawyers must preserve their independence from clients, ensuring that their actions prioritize justice and ethical standards rather than personal or client-driven motives. However, there exists discrepancy in the interpretation of the duty the counsel holds.^[45]While U.S. practice emphasizes near-total loyalty to the client, civil law jurisdictions consider lawyers as quasi-government agents, balancing obligations to the client, court, and society. Rule 11, that is derived from Rule 10 (b) of the IBA International Code of Ethics, affirm that lawyers are free to refuse a case but should not do so merely due to an unpopular client or cause; however, they must decline cases that are frivolous, fraudulent, criminal, or where personal emotions may impair effective representation.^[46] Rule 12,^[47] mirroring IBA International Code of Ethics Rule 10(c) and CCBE Rule 3.1.4 Acceptance and Termination of Instructions; CCBE Rule 3.5 Payment on Account,  states that once engaged, withdrawal is permitted only for valid reasons, i.e. withdrawal during the course for a “good cause” such as non-payment of fees, client dishonesty, or refusal to comply with tribunal orders, and must be done in a manner that safeguards the client’s interests. In cases where a client’s ethical violations compromise a lawyer’s professional standards, resignation must be handled responsibly, ensuring due notice, assistance in transitioning to new counsel, and the return of documents and unearned fees to prevent undue harm.

1. Establishing Justifiable Grounds for Withdrawal

While clients may discharge their attorneys with or without cause, legal professionals cannot resign without a valid reason. However, the term “good cause” remains undefined and is heavily dependent on the circumstances of each case.^[48] Guidance can be drawn from the ABA Rules, particularly Rule 1.16(b), which outlines instances where discretionary withdrawal is permitted. These include situations where resignation does not materially harm the client’s interests, when the client persists in illegal or fraudulent conduct, if the client has used the lawyer’s services to commit a crime, when irreconcilable differences arise between the lawyer and client, or when financial or professional burdens make continued representation unreasonably difficult.

Additionally, Rule 1.16(b)(7) serves as a broad, catch-all provision, allowing withdrawal for other justifiable reasons. This flexible clause ensures that attorneys can resign under ethical or moral considerations not explicitly mentioned in the rule.^[49] Factors such as a fundamental breakdown in the attorney-client relationship, failure to meet financial obligations, or a client’s refusal to cooperate with legal proceedings may qualify as “good cause.” However, determining whether a given situation constitutes a valid reason for resignation ultimately falls within the purview of adjudicatory bodies. This necessitates a careful balance between the attorney’s discretion to withdraw and the tribunal’s authority to protect the client’s rights and the integrity of proceedings.^[50]

• The Requirement of Prior Notice

In addition to justifiable grounds for withdrawal, attorneys are generally required to provide their clients with sufficient notice before stepping down. This ensures that clients have adequate time to secure alternative legal representation, preventing undue prejudice to their interests. The idea of “sufficient notice” is dependent on specific facts and differs according to the phase of the proceedings. For instance, if a lawyer steps down in the concluding phases of a case with substantial evidence and documentation, their departure might not fulfil the criteria for reasonable notice.^[51] The situation becomes even more complicated when a client has limited options for securing specialized legal representation. In such instances, notice is only deemed sufficient when replacement counsel is readily available. Some legal frameworks, such as the Canadian Bar Association Rules, specify that clients must be given ample time to engage new legal counsel before an attorney ceases representation.

An analysis comparing legal standards indicates that the right to resign is limited in scope. In addition to the two essential criteria of good cause and reasonable notice, further factors also influence the assessment of withdrawal requests. These encompass the timing of the departure during the legal proceedings, the particular justifications provided, and the possible detriment to the client. The relationship between an attorney and a client, while based on a contract, encompasses fiduciary duties, emphasizing that an attorney’s main obligation is to act in the best interests of their client. ^[52] Consequently, even in cases where good cause and sufficient notice exist, attorneys often require approval from an adjudicatory body before withdrawing from a case.

For instance, under Principle 7 of the IBA Principles 2018, legal counsel must seek judicial or tribunal approval before resigning. This highlights the involvement of courts and arbitral tribunals in overseeing attorney withdrawals. While courts have previously compelled attorneys to continue representing clients despite valid reasons for resignation, the question arises as to whether arbitral tribunals hold similar authority. Can tribunals adjudicate on an attorney’s right to withdraw? More importantly, can they compel legal representation under specific circumstances? Before examining the jurisdictional powers of arbitral tribunals in this context, it is essential to explore the broader role of adjudicatory bodies in regulating attorney withdrawals.

          VI.      Tribunals at the Helm: Exercising Inherent Authority in

Counsel Exclusions

In international arbitration, there is a widely acknowledged principle that an arbitral tribunal possesses an inherent authority and responsibility to uphold the equity and integrity of the arbitration process and the enforceability of the award. This inherent authority is accepted in almost all institutional rules, be it the SIAC, International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes [“ICSID”], the LCIA, or the ICC. Moreover, an arbitral tribunal possesses inherent jurisdiction to employ powers essential for ensuring the effective operation of the tribunal. The critical inquiry pertains to whether this authority extends to enforcing ethical standards and grants the tribunal the ability to impose sanctions. Historically, tribunals lacked such powers; however, this notion has since evolved.

Currently, there is an acceptance that a tribunal may enforce ethics and further have a right to issue sanctions, such as ordering the disqualification of counsel. The turning point was in the case of Hrvatska Elektroprivreda, d.d.

v. Republic of Slovenia [“Hrvatska”], where the arbitral tribunal made a ruling to disqualify the British barrister Mr. David Mildon QC of Essex Court Chambers London engaged by the Respondent. The barrister had joined the Respondent’s legal team after the tribunal was formed, and his involvement was disclosed merely ten days before the final hearing. Significantly, the barrister shared membership in the same Chambers as the tribunal’s president. The decision was grounded in the fundamental principle of upholding the integrity and permanence of properly constituted tribunals. The tribunal emphasized that altering the composition of a legal team post-constitution poses a risk to the tribunal’s credibility and lawful standing.

The case of Hrvatska largely accepted the enforcement of ethics by the Arbitral Tribunal.^[53] Further, in the case of The Rompetrol Group N.V. v. Romania, the Tribunal found no basis to disqualify the Counsel as there was no indication that the preservation of the integrity of the proceedings required the Tribunal to consider doing so. Similarly, in Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Services Worldwide v. The Republic of the Philippines,^[54] the tribunal made the decision not to disqualify Mr. Schwartz as there was “no real risk of prejudice to the current proceeding.” These cases illustrate that a tribunal can adjudicate ethical violations and ensure enforcement only when the ethical violations impede the tribunal’s proceedings to the extent that they compromise equity and fairness in the process.

Ideally, the decision regarding a counsel’s resignation should remain between the legal representative and their client. This principle was evident in the case of former U.S. President Donald Trump when two of his lawyers withdrew from representing him without requiring any adjudicatory

intervention.^[55] However, there are circumstances where the involvement of an adjudicatory body becomes necessary. The justification for such intervention is more practical than purely legal. If counsel were permitted to resign at will, it could lead to arbitrary withdrawals, potentially harming not just the client but also the opposing party and the integrity of the proceedings. To prevent disruptions and safeguard procedural continuity, affected parties are often given an opportunity to present the matter before the adjudicating body.

There are two primary circumstances under which a tribunal may need to intervene in matters concerning counsel resignation. First, when the resignation is contested by the client or the opposing party, and second, when the resignation poses a threat to the integrity and fairness of the proceedings.^[56]

In the first scenario, what would typically be a procedural matter escalates into a dispute. For instance, if a client opposes their counsel’s resignation despite the lawyer having valid grounds to withdraw, the adjudicatory body must evaluate the matter based on the contractual obligations between the counsel and client. Essentially, a tribunal’s jurisdiction over such matters is invoked only when a resignation is contested. Otherwise, the decision to resign remains a private contractual issue between the counsel and their client, independent of the case itself.^[57]

The second scenario does not necessarily involve a formal dispute over the resignation but arises when repeated counsel withdrawals appear to be a strategy to delay proceedings. In some cases, parties may even collude to use successive resignations as a procedural tactic to stall arbitration. Even

if no party formally objects to these resignations, their cumulative effect can compromise the efficiency of the arbitration process. Under such circumstances, the adjudicating body has a duty to step in and ensure that the integrity of the proceedings is not undermined. In other words, tribunals may have no choice but to condemn such conduct and take corrective measures.^[58]

International arbitration tribunals inherently possess the authority to address issues essential to the proper conduct of proceedings under their jurisdiction, even in the absence of explicit statutory provisions. This authority is often reinforced through institutional arbitration rules. Various internationally recognized arbitral institutions, including the UNCITRAL, the International Chamber of Commerce, the Permanent Court of Arbitration [“PCA”], and the ICSID, provide guidelines empowering tribunals to resolve procedural matters not explicitly covered by the parties’ agreements or governing laws.

In this regard, the ICSID Arbitration Rules, particularly Rule 3, impose an obligation on both the tribunal and the parties to conduct arbitration efficiently and cost-effectively.^[59]Consequently, when a counsel’s resignation affects procedural efficiency, the tribunal has the competence to intervene. This position is further supported by Article 44 of the ICSID Convention, which grants tribunals the authority to decide on ‘any question of procedure’ that is not addressed by the ICSID Convention or the rules agreed upon by the parties.^[60] Given the broad scope of this provision, tribunals can justify intervention in counsel resignations on the basis that such resignations impact the orderly conduct of proceedings.

A crucial question that arises is whether an arbitral tribunal is even empowered to adjudicate such matters. Fortunately, precedents confirm that tribunals do hold the authority to rule on counsel resignations, as this falls within the procedural aspects of arbitration. As discussed earlier, tribunals have entertained objections and issued rulings on counsel withdrawals in cases where such resignations threatened procedural integrity.^[61] This demonstrates that a tribunal’s role extends beyond mere oversight- it actively ensures that arbitration is conducted in a fair and orderly manner.

So, while counsel resignations are primarily private contractual matters, they can sometimes necessitate tribunal intervention. When resignations become contentious or are used to disrupt proceedings, adjudicatory bodies have both the authority and responsibility to address them. Institutional arbitration rules, particularly those of ICSID, ICC, UNCITRAL, and PCA, provide broad discretionary powers to tribunals to maintain procedural efficiency. Thus, while counsel resignation is generally a private decision, it remains subject to regulatory scrutiny when it interferes with the proper administration of justice in international arbitration.

Therefore, if a party exploits counsel resignation to cause delays, the tribunal must treat it as a procedural matter and intervene to safeguard the adjudicatory process on its merits.^[62] Similarly, Article 17 of the PCA Arbitration Rules (2012) and Article 22 of the ICC Arbitration Rules (2021) recognise the tribunal’s authority to address counsel withdrawals.^[63] Given the limited jurisprudence on the subject, the decisions that do exist show that tribunals treat counsel resignations as procedural matters, intervening only to preserve the integrity the proceedings.

VII. Stepping down or stuck: The complexities of voluntary counsel resignation in arbitration

Cases involving voluntary resignation of counsel have seldom been presented before tribunals for formal adjudication. However, given that tribunals have the authority to decide on procedural matters such as disqualifications and exclusions, one might assume that voluntary resignations would also fall within their domain. However, such an approach oversimplifies the issue and overlooks its complexities. The enforcement of compelled legal representation raises fundamental concerns regarding both the rights of legal professionals and the interests of the clients they serve. If tribunals were to mandate continued representation against a lawyer’s wishes, it could lead to severe ethical, procedural, and professional consequences.

A. The Substantive Right of Lawyers to Resign

Unlike the exclusion of legal representatives, the decision to resign from representation should be acknowledged as a fundamental substantive right of legal practitioners.^[64] A lawyer’s decision to withdraw from a case is often based on ethical, professional, or personal reasons, and compelling representation would infringe upon this substantive right. It is crucial to recognise that once an attorney explicitly expresses their unwillingness to continue, forcing them to do so could significantly disrupt the legal process and ultimately harm the integrity of the profession. Such matters, therefore, should be adjudicated by judicial bodies rather than arbitral tribunals, as courts derive their authority from sovereign powers and have the necessary enforcement mechanisms.^[65]

A tribunal’s attempt to coerce a lawyer into continuing representation despite their resignation request would raise questions about the enforceability of such an order. Unlike courts, tribunals lack the inherent authority to enforce such decisions, making it unclear how they could compel compliance. Consequently, if a tribunal rules against a lawyer’s resignation, how can it ensure the lawyer abides by that ruling? Without binding enforcement power, such orders may hold little practical weight, creating confusion and inefficiency in arbitration proceedings.

B. The Issue of Specific Performance in Legal Representation

Forcing an attorney to continue representing a client against their will is akin to ordering specific performance of a contract for personal services, an approach that is generally impermissible in legal systems worldwide.^[66] In contracts for services, individuals retain control over their labour, and compelling performance is an exceptional remedy, usually limited to cases such as military conscription.⁶⁸ Legal practitioners must not be treated as service providers who can be forced to work against their will, particularly when their professional judgment dictates otherwise.

Indian jurisprudence has long upheld the principle that contracts requiring personal services cannot be enforced through specific performance.^[67] The Specific Relief Act, 1963, emphasizes that a party’s continued willingness to fulfil contractual obligations is essential.^[68] Courts have consistently interpreted that willingness must complement capability, meaning that a lawyer who has sought withdrawal from representation can no longer be

https://opil.ouplaw.com/display/10.1093/law-mpeipro/e1382.013.1382/law-mpeiproe1382.

considered ‘willing’ to perform their duties, regardless of their competency. Under section 53 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, clients are entitled to monetary compensation if a lawyer’s resignation disrupts their case, but compelling continued representation is not a legally supported remedy.^[69] This principle suggests that international arbitration should consider developing compensation mechanisms to protect client interests without coercing unwilling lawyers into continued representation. However, such a mechanism could be problematic if lawyers remain on a case merely to avoid financial penalties, as their motivation to advocate effectively may be compromised.

C. The Impact on Client Interests and Effective Representation

A key issue in counsel resignation is whether compelling a lawyer to continue representation truly serves the client’s best interests. Legal representation is most effective when counsel can advocate persuasively and without constraints. If a tribunal forces a lawyer to remain, the quality of that representation becomes uncertain. This was a central concern in Peter de Sutter and Kristof De Sutter v. Republic of Madagascar,^[70] where the right to effective counsel was raised as a ground for annulment. However, the ad hoc committee refused to annul the award, holding that while the right to legal representation is a fundamental procedural rule, the right to effective counsel is not. This contrasts with domestic legal systems like those in the United States and India, where courts recognise the right to counsel as encompassing effective representation. Such divergence raises concerns about potential prejudice to parties in arbitration.

D. The Problem of Enforceability and Jurisdictional Ambiguities

A major issue arises when a tribunal rejects a lawyer’s resignation request. If the lawyer still refuses to appear, how can the client ensure enforcement of the tribunal’s decision? Since tribunals lack sovereign enforcement powers, clients would likely need to seek assistance from national courts, making the process significantly more cumbersome. This was evident in ICC Case No. 8879, where the tribunal acknowledged that it lacked the inherent authority to regulate counsel conduct comprehensively and deferred to national courts for enforcement.^[71]

The question of which court holds jurisdiction over enforcement further complicates matters. The international legal community has identified multiple possible regulators of counsel conduct, including national bar associations, courts at the seat of arbitration, courts where the award is enforced, arbitral tribunals, arbitral institutions, and even proposals for a ‘Global Arbitration Ethics Council.’ However, discrepancies remain, and the lack of a clear forum for enforcement leads to inconsistencies and practical difficulties.

E. A Tribunal’s Limited Role in Counsel Resignations

Ultimately, arbitral tribunals have a narrow role in regulating voluntary counsel resignations. While they may intervene in cases involving collusion or bad faith, they lack the authority to mandate representation against a lawyer’s will. The more appropriate approach for tribunals to safeguard the arbitration process is by refusing to delay proceedings or by deciding the matter based on the available evidence. In high-profile instances, such as the resignation of law firms representing Russian clients due to sanctions,

judicial forums and not arbitral tribunals, handled the matter. In Latham & Watkins’ withdrawal from representing a sanctioned Russian bank in Manhattan Federal Court, the court allowed for a potential default judgment against the bank when no replacement counsel was found.^[72]

Thus, the practical solution for arbitration proceedings is not to coerce continued representation but to streamline procedural responses, such as rendering awards based on available evidence or granting clients time to secure new legal representation. Compelling unwilling counsel to appear would create more problems than solutions, compromising the quality of advocacy and creating procedural uncertainties that tribunals are illequipped to address.

                              VIII.      Challenges and Implications

1. Procedural Disruptions

Ethical resignations in high-stakes international disputes introduce significant procedural disruptions. Arbitration, valued for its efficiency, is particularly susceptible to setbacks when legal counsel withdraws midproceedings. Such resignations can lead to adjournments, procedural deadlocks, and tribunal interventions to ensure the continuity of representation. The departure of counsel may compel parties to seek emergency arbitrator relief, request deadline extensions, or even face default judgments if they fail to secure replacement counsel in time. The challenge is exacerbated in cases where the resigning counsel played a critical role in case strategy, making the transition to new representation more timeconsuming and costly.

These delays disproportionately impact claimants, particularly those with limited financial resources. A respondent state or well-funded corporate entity may leverage its counsel’s resignation strategically to prolong proceedings, imposing additional economic strain on weaker parties. This disruption contradicts arbitration’s core principles of efficiency, costeffectiveness, and party autonomy. As seen in Victor Pey Casado v. Chile, unnecessary delays stemming from counsel resignations have inflated costs and created procedural uncertainty, ultimately undermining the integrity of arbitral proceedings.

• Jurisdictional Inconsistencies

A significant challenge arising from ethical resignations is the lack of a harmonised approach across jurisdictions and arbitral institutions. Across jurisdictions, the rules governing a lawyer’s ability to withdraw from representation vary significantly. Some legal systems impose strict ethical obligations, limiting such withdrawal, while others grant broader discretion, often without needing tribunal consent. This divergence poses serious challenges in international arbitration, where cross-border legal norms frequently collide.  

Although institutions like the LCIA have set out defined rules for counsel conduct, ICSID has yet to clarify whether tribunals can intervene in cases involving ethical resignations.^[73] This lack of guidance has left parties navigating a grey area, with arbitral approaches varying widely. The issue is becoming increasingly prominent in Investor-State disputes, where tribunals are being asked to determine whether counsel should be disqualified on ethical grounds. These cases raise difficult questions about fairness, party autonomy, and the limits of tribunal authority in regulating professional behaviour, an area where international arbitration still lacks a coherent and consistent framework. In Hrvatska, for instance, tensions emerged between a party’s right to select its legal representation and the tribunal’s duty to uphold fair proceedings free from conflicts of interest.^[74]

This ambiguity has broader implications. Counsel considering resignation due to ethical concerns must balance their professional responsibilities against the potential breach of contractual obligations with their clients. Meanwhile, tribunals face a legal grey area when determining whether to permit or regulate such resignations in the absence of clear, uniform standards. The inconsistency in tribunal rulings fuels unpredictability, weakening arbitration’s reliability as a dispute resolution mechanism.

• Economic Ramifications

The financial toll of ethical resignations in arbitration can be considerable. When counsel withdraws mid-proceeding, especially in high-stakes or technically complex cases, parties often incur steep costs.^[75] New counsel must be retained and brought up to speed, which not only increases legal fees but also leads to duplication of effort and delays in the arbitration timeline. For well-resourced parties, these costs may be inconvenient but manageable. However, for individuals, small businesses, or financially constrained states, the consequences are far more serious. Securing equally skilled replacement counsel on short notice may be difficult or even impossible, leaving these parties at a disadvantage. In some instances, the financial burden and procedural setbacks may force a claimant to abandon the case or accept a suboptimal settlement simply to avoid spiralling expenses.

At the same time, wealthier parties may exploit these disruptions to their advantage. A resignation on the other side can become an opportunity to stall proceedings or extract concessions. This imbalance raises important questions about fairness and equality of arms. In Victor Pey Casado v. Chile, the tribunal recognised how counsel conduct can influence procedural fairness and cost outcomes, underscoring the need for clearer safeguards to prevent such imbalances from undermining justice.^[76]

• Legal and Ethical Dilemmas

The resignations of prominent lawyers such as Pellet and Reichler underscore a growing ethical dilemma in international dispute resolution.^[77] Legal practitioners are bound by duties of loyalty and diligence to their clients, yet recent resignations suggest that moral and political considerations increasingly influence these decisions. This shift raises fundamental questions about the role of lawyers in adversarial proceedings: should they be guided solely by legal and professional obligations, or should their personal ethical convictions take precedence?

Traditionally, legal representation has been treated as a fundamental right, with lawyers expected to act as advocates irrespective of personal beliefs. However, resignations in cases involving Russia, Nicaragua, and other politically sensitive disputes indicate a shift toward a more conscientious approach to representation. While this may reflect evolving professional responsibility standards, it also risks undermining the principle that all parties, regardless of the nature of their legal issues, are entitled to competent representation.

Another legal complexity arises concerning whether ethical resignations should be subject to tribunal oversight.^[78] In the absence of uniform rules, arbitral tribunals follow inconsistent approaches. Some require counsel to justify their withdrawal, while others leave the decision entirely to their discretion.^[79] This inconsistency creates procedural uncertainty and leads to conflicting outcomes. Meanwhile, greater transparency in arbitration has drawn increased public attention to counsel conduct, reinforcing the need for clear ethical standards to ensure fairness and consistency across arbitral proceedings.^[80]

• Impact on the Perception of International Arbitration

The rise in ethical resignations in arbitration raises concerns about the system’s legitimacy. Arbitration has long been upheld as a neutral space for legal resolution, free from political or moral bias. However, the increasing number of resignations signals that personal ethics and political ideologies are now playing a more significant role in decisions about legal representation.

This trend risks reinforcing perceptions that arbitration is not wholly independent but is increasingly vulnerable to external political pressures. Recent empirical work supports this concern. The 2021 Queen Mary and White & Case International Arbitration Survey reported that a notable share of respondents viewed political narratives and public scrutiny as emerging threats to arbitral independence, which indicates that stakeholders now see arbitration as more exposed to external influence than in previous years.^[81]

Academic commentary has also argued that controversies involving counsel removals or withdrawals in high-profile cases have drawn attention to the fragility of perceived neutrality in the arbitral process, suggesting that these developments can erode confidence in arbitration’s structural independence.^[82]

If parties believe that legal representation can be withdrawn arbitrarily based on shifting ethical considerations, confidence in arbitration as a stable and predictable dispute resolution mechanism may erode. Furthermore, states and corporate entities may hesitate to engage in arbitration if they fear that external pressures could compel their legal representatives to resign. This could drive parties toward alternative dispute resolution mechanisms or traditional litigation, diminishing arbitration’s appeal as an impartial and efficient process.^[83]

                                         IX.      Proposed Reforms

A. Incorporating Explicit Provisions for Counsel Withdrawal

One of the major gaps in international arbitration rules is the absence of explicit provisions governing counsel withdrawal. This lack of regulation leads to inconsistencies in how tribunals address resignations, creating uncertainty for both legal practitioners and disputing parties.

For instance, in Rompetrol Group N.V. v. Romania,^[84] the tribunal acknowledged that while ICSID Arbitration Rules do not expressly empower tribunals to regulate counsel conduct, tribunals inherently possess

such authority in exceptional circumstances. Similarly, in Hrvatska the tribunal relied on the principle of the “immutability of properly constituted tribunals” to justify its power to decide on counsel removal requests.^[85] However, in the absence of codified provisions, tribunals have continued to navigate such issues on a case-by-case basis, leading to unpredictability.

To address this issue, arbitration institutions should introduce clear guidelines on counsel withdrawal. First, mandatory notice periods would ensure that counsel resign with sufficient time, allowing the affected party to secure alternative representation without delays. Second, tribunals should have the authority to review the reasons for resignations and their potential impact on the fairness of the proceedings. Lastly, financial safeguards must be put in place to prevent parties from being exploited through strategic resignations, ensuring that increased costs and disruptions are minimised. These measures would promote greater predictability and stability in arbitration.

B. Strengthening Tribunal and Institutional Oversight of Counsel Conduct

Arbitral tribunals face clear limitations when it comes to enforcing ethical and professional standards. Unlike domestic courts, they lack disciplinary powers beyond case management tools, leaving a regulatory gap that can be exploited. Counsel may resign without clear justification, potentially disrupting proceedings. To address this, tribunals should be empowered to assess both the necessity and timing of resignation requests, and to reject those that would cause undue delay or prejudice. Sanctions should also be available where withdrawals are misused for tactical advantage, reinforcing procedural fairness.^[86]

One of the central challenges in enhancing tribunal oversight lies in arbitration’s structure itself. The absence of binding precedent means tribunals operate on a case-by-case basis, often yielding inconsistent decisions. This makes it difficult to establish a coherent approach. Arbitral institutions must step in by developing clear, standardized protocols to govern counsel resignations. These procedural rules would not only promote consistency but also reduce the unpredictability that undermines confidence in the arbitral process.

Traditionally, arbitral institutions have limited their role to procedural oversight. However, as ethical issues become more prominent, these bodies are increasingly positioned to shape and enforce standards of counsel conduct in a more active and principled manner.^[87] In light of this, and with the growing number of strategic resignations, institutions must take a more proactive role in establishing enforceable rules. The 2015 Queen Mary/White & Case International Arbitration Survey indicated that 35 percent of respondents supported regulating counsel conduct through institutional rules, reflecting a growing consensus in favour of institutional oversight. Scholars such as Uran Bidegain have similarly argued that arbitral institutions are well-positioned to regulate counsel conduct, as they are widely accepted by the international community and already serve as guardians of procedural fairness.^[88]

Given these perspectives, arbitral institutions should move toward codifying formal rules on counsel withdrawal. Doing so would reduce reliance on ad hoc tribunal decisions and create a more structured framework that protects the integrity of arbitration proceedings.

C. Harmonizing Ethical Standards Across Jurisdictions

Ethical obligations governing legal practitioners vary significantly across jurisdictions, leading to inconsistencies in how counsel resignations are managed in international arbitration. Some legal systems impose strict professional responsibility rules that limit a lawyer’s ability to resign, while others grant broader discretion to counsel without requiring tribunal approval. This fragmentation creates uncertainty and makes it difficult to apply a uniform standard across different arbitral proceedings.

A harmonized framework for ethical resignations is necessary to ensure greater consistency in arbitration. Such a framework should establish clear guidelines on permissible grounds for withdrawal, distinguishing between ethical resignations and strategic resignations that disrupt procedural fairness. It should also define the responsibilities of withdrawing counsel in ensuring a smooth transition to new representation, minimizing any adverse effects on the arbitration process. Furthermore, disclosure requirements should be standardized, mandating that tribunals and opposing parties be promptly informed of resignation requests.^[89]

By adopting a harmonized ethical code, arbitral institutions can reduce jurisdictional inconsistencies and promote procedural fairness. Drawing on best practices from leading arbitration hubs, such a framework would strengthen the legitimacy and predictability of international arbitration while ensuring that all parties adhere to a common set of ethical standards.

D. Codifying Provisions in the Multilateral Investment Court  

The European Union’s proposal to establish a ‘Multilateral Investment Court’ [“MIC”] presents a unique opportunity to introduce binding regulations on

counsel resignation.^[90] The MIC, envisioned as a permanent adjudicatory body for investment disputes, is currently under negotiation within UNCITRAL’s Working Group III.^[91] If implemented, it would replace the ad hoc investor-state dispute settlement [“ISDS”]) mechanism with a structured, rule-based system.

Given its institutional structure, the MIC should build in several safeguards. It should begin by setting out clear, binding rules on how counsel may withdraw, ensuring that parties are not exposed to unfair disadvantage when representation changes unexpectedly. It should also create a framework that allows the tribunal to examine the circumstances surrounding a proposed resignation and address attempts to use withdrawals as a tactic to delay proceedings, including through appropriate sanctions. Finally, the MIC’s tenured adjudicators should be entrusted with oversight of counsel conduct so that ethical standards are applied consistently, and the integrity of the process is maintained.

However, the MIC proposal has faced resistance from states such as the United States, Japan, and Russia, which prefer bilateral mechanisms over systemic reform. Critics argue that a centralized court could be subject to political influence, potentially discouraging investor confidence.^[92] Nonetheless, if the MIC is established with strong procedural protections, it has the potential to offer a valuable framework for addressing counsel conduct more consistently across the broader field of international arbitration.

                                               X.     Conclusion

The growing incidence of ethical resignations in international arbitration has brought important concerns to the forefront, particularly regarding procedural fairness, stability, and the integrity of the arbitral process. Although arbitration is intended to offer efficiency and predictability, the absence of clear rules governing counsel withdrawal has introduced uncertainty and inconsistency. Without established institutional guidance, tribunals are left to develop ad hoc responses, which often result in delays, increased costs for less-resourced parties, and opportunities for strategic misuse by stronger litigants.

To address these challenges, reform must strike a careful balance between respecting party autonomy and ensuring procedural safeguards. A key priority is the introduction of clear, codified rules on counsel withdrawal. Mandating notice periods, enabling tribunal review of resignation requests, and instituting financial protections can help contain the disruptive effects of last-minute withdrawals. Tribunals should also be given the authority to assess whether a resignation is justified or unduly prejudicial. However, the decentralized nature of arbitration poses real obstacles to consistency. A harmonized ethical framework, informed by comparative best practices, is essential to guide professional conduct and promote fairness across arbitral proceedings. Arbitral institutions must also play a more active role in regulating counsel conduct. By incorporating enforceable rules on withdrawals and professional ethics, institutions can foster greater consistency and confidence in arbitration as a fair and stable dispute resolution mechanism. The evolving discourse surrounding the proposed MIC further highlights the necessity of structured reforms, as a permanent body with binding guidelines could provide greater clarity in managing counsel resignations. Ultimately, addressing these gaps is essential to preserving the legitimacy of international arbitration and ensuring that it remains a reliable forum for resolving complex disputes.

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[1] Pellet, A. et al, I resigned because Russia had become an absolutely indefensible client, VÖLKERRECHTSBLOG. (July 2022) available at https://voelkerrechtsblog.org/i-resignedbecause-russia-had-become-an-absolutely-indefensible-client/.  

[2] Saunders, A. Law after dominium: thinking with Martti Koskenniemi on property, sovereignty and transformation, 13 Transnational Legal Theory, 475, 13(4), pp. 475–492 (2022).  

[3] Sanderson, C., Van den Berg withdraws from Yukos Case, GLOBAL ARBITRATION REVIEW, (Mar. 2, 2022), available at https://globalarbitrationreview.com/van-den-berg-withdrawsyukos-case.  

[4] Joyce Fog, Singapore: The Rising Star in International Arbitration, IFC REV. (Sep. 6, 2023), available at https://www.ifcreview.com/articles/2023/september/singapore-the-risingstar-in-international-arbitration/.

[5] Jason Chan Tai-Hui, Alvin Chen & Kenneth Lim Tao Chun, Professional Ethics – An Update,

THE SINGAPORE             LAW         GAZETTE           (2021),   available at https://lawgazette.com.sg/practice/ethics-in-practice/professional-ethics-an-update/.

[6] Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015, Rule 34 (Sing.).

[7] Id.

[8] The Law Society of Singapore v. Ong Teck Ghee, (2014) SGDT 7 (Sing.).  

[9] Law Society of Singapore v. Tan Chun Chuen Malcolm, (2020) SGHC 16 (Sing.).

[10] Ingrid M. Evans, Ethical Considerations in Withdrawing from Representation, ADVOCATE (Feb. 2023), available at https://www.advocatemagazine.com/article/2023-february/ethicalconsiderations-in-withdrawing-from-representation.  

[11] Rule 1.16, Model Rules of Professional Conduct (American Bar Association 1983), available at

https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_ rules_of_professional_conduct/.

[12] Estate of Falco v. Decker, (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1004, ¶ 1014 (U.S.).

[13] Aceves v. Superior Court (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 584 (U.S.).

[14] Academy of Calif. Optometrists v. Superior Court (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 999, ¶ 1006 (U.S.).

[15] Rachel Thomas, How Closely Linked Are the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration and Indian Arbitration Regulations?, VIA MEDIATION CENTRE & ARBITRATION CENTRE https://viamediationcentre.org/readnews/NDY=/How-closelylinked-are-the-UNCITRAL-Model-Law-on-International-Commercial-Arbitration-andIndian-Arbitration-Regulations.

[16] Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, § 19, (India) [hereinafter “Arbitration Act”].

[17] Id., at § 18.

[18] Id., at § 24.

[19] Bar Council of India Rules, § 1, Chapter II, Part VI, Gazette of India, pt. III, sec. 4 (Dec. 1, 1961).

[20] Maxi Scherer, Conduct of Legal Representatives under the 2014 LCIA Arbitration Rules: How to

Apply the New Provisions, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Mar. 23, 2015), available at https://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2015/03/23/conduct-of-legalrepresentatives-under-the-2014-lcia-arbitration-rules-how-to-apply-the-new-provisions/.

[21] Changing Lawyers During an International Arbitration, ACERIS LAW (June 3,2021), available at https://www.acerislaw.com/changing-lawyers-during-an-international-arbitration/ [hereinafter, “Aceris L. Art. on Changing Lawyers”].

[22] Id.

[23] Arbitration Rules for the Australian Centre for International Commercial Arbitration, 2021, Art. 9.2. [hereinafter “ACICA Arb. Rules, 2021”].

[24] RULES            ON         PROFESSIONAL         STANDARDS      (Bar      Council       of       India)

<https://www.barcouncilofindia.org/info/rules-on-professional-standards.  

[25] SRA Standards and Regulations (Solicitors Regulation Authority), https://www.sra.org.uk/solicitors/standards-regulations/; The Bar Standards Board Handbook 2023, https://www.barstandardsboard.org.uk/static/de77ead9-9400-4c9dbef91353ca9e5345/215266f4-c7ef-44ca-a32bff5f549f1921/second-editiontest31072019104713.pdf.  

[26] The Study Group of the International Law Association on the Practice and Procedure of International Courts and Tribunals, The Hague Principles on Ethical Standards for Counsel Appearing before International Courts and Tribunals, (2010) available at https://www.ucl.ac.uk/international-courts/sites/internationalcourts/files/hague_sept2010.pdf.  

[27] International Bar Association, IBA General Principles for the Legal Profession (2006) available at https://www.ibanet.org/MediaHandler?id=e067863f-8f42-41d8-9f48-d813f25f793c.

[28] International Bar Association, IBA International Principles on Conduct for the Legal Profession (2018) available at https://www.ibanet.org/document?id=-International-Principles-onConduct-for-the-Legal-Profession-2018.

[29] Id., Principle 3.

[30] Id., Principle 7.  ³¹  Id., Principle 9.  

[31] International Bar Association, IBA Guidelines on Party Representation in International Arbitration (2013) available at https://www.ibanet.org/MediaHandler?id=6F0C57D7-E7A0-43AFB76E-714D9FE74D7F [hereinafter “IBA Party Representation Guidelines”].  

[32] J. Wessel & G. McAllister, Towards a Workable Approach to Ethical Regulation in International Arbitration, Vol. 10 CANADIAN INT’L LAWYERS, (2015).  

[33] Fahira Brodlija, Counsel Ethics in International Arbitration: The Glass Slipper Still Does Not Fit,

     KLUWER             ARB.             BLOG         (July         2,         2021),         available          at

https://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2021/07/02/counsel-ethics-ininternational-arbitration-the-glass-slipper-still-does-not-fit/.

[34] IBA Party Representation Guidelines, supra note 32.

[35] Code                     of                    conduct                    For                     European

Lawyers, https://www.ccbe.eu/fileadmin/speciality_distribution/public/documents/de ontology/deon_coc/en_deonto_2021_model_code.pdf (last visited Feb. 9, 2025). 

[36] E. Williams, Institutional Approaches to Ethics in Arbitration, Vol. 4, THE ARBITRATOR & MEDIATOR, 21, 22-27 (2022).

[37] Singapore Institute of Arbitrators (SIARB), Guidelines on Party Representative Ethics, 2018.  

[38] ACICA Arb. Rules, 2021, supra note 23, Art. 9.2.

[39] Arbitration Rules for the Australian Centre for International Commercial Arbitration, 2016, Art. 8.2 [hereinafter, [“ACICA Arb. Rules, 2016”].

[40] Justyna Stadniczeńko The Importance Of Ethics In The Legal Profession Vol. 18, BIULETYN STOWARZYSZENIA, 279-295 (2021).

[41] Redaccion Confidencial, Attorney Paul Reichler resigns from the Ortega Government, CONFIDENTIAL (Mar. 27, 2022) available at https://confidencial.digital/93nglish/attorneypaul-reichler-resigns-from-the-ortega-government/.  

[42] Jenna Greene, White & Case Can’t Quit Russia. Karma?, THOMAS REUTERS (Jul. 19, 2022), available at https://www.reuters.com/legal/litigation/white-case-cant-quit-russia-karma2022-07-19/.

[43] Rule 1.16, Model Rules of Professional Conduct (American Bar Association 1983), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_ rules_of_professional_conduct/.

[44] Doak Bishop & Margrete Stevens, International Code of Ethics for Lawyers Practicing Before International Arbitral Tribunals (International Council for Commercial Arbitration Cong.,

2010),           available at          https://cdn.arbitration-icca.org/s3fspublic/document/media_document/stevens_bishop_draft_code_of_ethics_in_ia.pdf.  

[45] Id., rule 2.

[46] Id., rule 11.

[47] Id., rule 12.

[48] Hartwig v. Johnsen 2008 UT 40 (U.S.); see Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Equity Financial Group, LLCl, Civil No. 04-1512 of 2006 (RBK) (U.S.).

[49] American Bar Association, Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.16(b)(1)-(6),

     (1983),                                               available                                                at

https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_ rules_of_professional_conduct/.  

[50] Hartwig v. Johnsen, 2008 UT 40 (U.S.).

[51] Nemerov & Singer, P.C., 2009 NY Slip Op 52697(U) [26 Misc. 3d 1209(A)] (U.S.).

[52] Kokkanda B. Poondacha v. K.D. Ganapathi, AIR 2011 SC 1353 (Ind.).

[53] Hrvatska Elektropriveda d.d. v. Republic of Slovenia , ICSID Case No. ARBl05124 (Order Concerning the Participation of Counsel), (6 May 2008), 10 ICSID Rep. (2008) [hereinafter, “Hrvatska”].  

[54] Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Services Worldwide v Republic of the Philippines (I) , ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25, (Decision on the Application for Annulment of Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Services Worldwide), (23 December 2010), 18 ICSID Rep. 103 (2016).

[55] Caitlin O’Kane, 2 Lawyers from Trump’s Legal Team Resigned after He was Indicted on Federal Charges CBS News, (Jul. 4, 2022), available at https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trumplawyers-resign-indictment-legal-team-jim-trusty-john-rowley/.  

[56] Virgin Enters. v. Virginic LLC, [2019] EWHC 672 (Ch) (Eng.); East Cement for Investment Company v. Poland, ICC Case No. 16509/JHN (2009).

[57] Id.

[58] Id.

[59] International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) Arbitration Rules, 2022, Rule. 3.  

[60] Convention on The Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States,2022, Art. 44; The Rompetrol Group N.V. v. Romania, ICSID Case No.

ARB/06/3l (Award) (6 May 2013) 31 ICSID Rep. (2025).

[61] Hrvatska, supra note 54.  

[62] East Cement for Investment Company v. Poland, ICC Case No. 16509/JHN (2009).

[63] Permanent Court of Arbitration Rules 2012, Art.17; International Chambers of Commerce Rules of Arbitration 2021, Art 22.

[64] Bharat Barrel and Drum Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. ESI Corpn., (1971) 2 SCC 860 (Ind.).

[65] Supreme Court Bar Assn. v. Union of India, (1998) 4 SCC 409 (Ind.); Hilde

Farthofer, Contempt of Court, Max Planck Institutional for Comparative Public Law &

     International          Law          (MPIL)          (Feb.          2019)          available           at

[66] Church of North India v. Rt. Reverend Ashoke Biswas, 2019 SCC OnLine Cal 3842 (Ind.). ⁶⁸  Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918) (U.S.).

[67] Ram Charan Bajpai v. Rakhal Das Mookerjee, 1913 SCC OnLine Cal 139 (Ind.); SVF

Entertainment Pvt. Ltd. v. Anupriyo Sengupta, 2018 SCC OnLine Cal 4775 (Ind.); Chander Shekhar Malhotra v. Nirlon, Ltd., 1999 SCC OnLine Bom 514 (Ind.).

[68] U.N. Krishnamurthy v. A.M. Krishnamurthy, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 840 (Ind.).

[69] In re Resignation of Leone, 160 Ohio St. 3d 1227, 155 N.E.3d 950(2020) (U.S.).

[70] (DS)2, S.A., Peter de Sutter and Kristof De Sutter v. Republic of Madagascar, ICSID Case No. ARB/17/18 (Award) (Apr. 17, 2020).

[71] Charles B. Rosenberg & M. Imad Khan, Who Should Regulate Counsel Conduct in International

     Arbitration?,      KLUWER        ARB.        BLOG,      (Apr.      18,      2016)      available       at

https://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2016/04/18/who-should-regulatecounsel-conduct-in-international-arbitration/ [hereinafter, “Roseberg”].

[72] Jacqueline Thomsen, Russia’s VTB Bank Found in Default in U.S. Lawsuit over Downed Airliner REUTERS, (Aug. 25, 2022) available at

https://www.reuters.com/legal/transactional/russias-vtb-bank-found-default-us-lawsuitover-downed-airliner-2022-08-24/.

[73] 75  Rosenberg, supra note 73.

[74] Hrvatska supra note 54; The Rompetrol Group N.V. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/3, Decision on the Participation of a Counsel (Jan. 14, 2010).

[75] ROY WEINSTEIN ET AL., Efficiency and Economic Benefits of Dispute Resolution through Arbitration Compared with U.S. District Court Proceedings, MICRONOMICS (Mar. 2017), available at https://go.adr.org/rs/294-SFS-

516/images/Economic%20Impact%20of%20Delay%20Micronomics%20Final%20Repo rt%20%282017-03-07%29.pdf.

[76] Víctor Pey Casado and President Allende Foundation v. Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/2 (Award) (May 8, 2008).

[77] Pellet, A. et al, I resigned because Russia had become an absolutely indefensible client, VÖLKERRECHTSBLOG. (July 4, 2022) available at https://voelkerrechtsblog.org/iresigned-because-russia-had-become-an-absolutely-indefensible-client/.

[78] Sonia Anwar-Ahmed Martinez, Transparency Rules in Investment Arbitration: Institutional

Differences and Prospects of Standardisation, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Apr. 8, 2021) available at https://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2021/04/08/transparency-rules-ininvestment-arbitration-institutional-differences-and-prospects-of-standardisation/.

[79] Id.

[80] Aceris L. Art. on Changing Lawyers supra note 21.

[81] Queen Mary Univ. of London & White & Case, 2021 International Arbitration Survey:

Adapting Arbitration to a Changing World 18 (2021).

[82] Alan Scott Rau, Arbitrators Without Powers? Disqualifying Counsel in Arbitral Proceedings, U Texas Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 555 (2014) available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2403054.; Bishop & Stevens, supra note 46.

[83] Anton G. Maurer, How International Commercial Arbitration Can Be More Efficient, Speedier, and

     Less       Costly,       JAMS       ADR        (Oct.        25,       2023)        available         at

https://www.jamsadr.com/blog/2023/how-international-commercial-arbitration-canbe-more-efficient (last visited Feb 11, 2025).

[84] The Rompetrol Group N.V. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/3 (Award) (6 May 2013).

[85] Hrvatska supra note 54.

[86] Rosenberg, supra note 73.

[87] Id.

[88] Id.

[89] Iris Ng, Rethinking Counsel Ethics in International Arbitration, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Dec. 12, 2019) available at https://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2019/12/12/rethinkingcounsel-ethics-in-international-arbitration/.

[90] Council Directive 12981/17 of 20 March 2018, Negotiating directives for a Convention establishing a multilateral court for the settlement of investment disputes, ADD 1 DCL 1.

[91] United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Fiftieth Session, ¶ 46, U.N. Doc. A/72/17 (July 21, 2017).

[92] Anthea Roberts & Taylor St John, UNCITRAL and ISDS Reforms: The Divided West and the Battle by and for the Rest, EJIL: Talk! (Apr. 30, 2019) available at

https://www.ejiltalk.org/uncitral-and-isds-reforms-the-divided-west-and-the-battle-byand-for-the-rest/.